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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE YOUNG AND FRERICKS CASES: RE-EXAMINING
TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF MANUFACTURER LIABILITY
FOR PRODUCT DEFECTS
The expanding scope of product liability raised questions
concerning the status of prior legal concepts in the area of
design defects. The author discusses the present position of the
law and the continued viability of the familiar "latent-patent"
test of liability in Maryland.
In two recent Maryland cases, Volkswagen of America v. Young' and
Frericks v. General Motors Corp.2 the Maryland Court of Appeals has
imposed liability upon a manufacturer of automobiles for design
defects enhancing injuries to the occupant following a collision. These
decisions necessitate a re-examination of the principles that govern
liability of manufacturers in this state.
EVOLUTION OF PRESENT LAW
Traditionally, liability has not been imposed on manufacturers for
defects that were patent or obvious to the user. Thus, in Campo v.
Scofield,3 the New York court held that a manufacturer had done all
that the law demanded if its product performed as was intended, was
without a latent defect and created no greater danger than that which
was known to the user.4
It should be noted that Campo involved a design defect.5 Prior to
this case manufacturers had been held liable for any construction
defects resulting in direct injuries to users of their products.6 Likewise,
manufacturers have been held liable for latent design defects which
1. 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
2. 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975).
3. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950) (injury resulted when plaintiff caught his hand in an
onion-topping machine produced without a guard).
4. Id. at 471, 95 N.E.2d at 804.
5. "They differ from other product liability cases involving defective [products] by the
combination of two factors. First, the alleged defect is in the design of the [product]
rather than a negligent deviation during the construction or assembly process from the
manner in which the vehicle was supposed to be made. The latter is usually called a
'construction defect.' Second, the defect is not the cause of the initial impact."
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 207, 321 A.2d 737, 740.
6. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
caused injury-producing7 accidents as well as for design defects which
directly inflicted injury. 8
With the foundation thus laid, the stage was set for the courts to
consider the issue of a manufacturer's liability for design defects
enhancing injuries following the accident-the "second collision." 9 In
the first case addressing itself directly to this issue, Evans v. General
Motors Corp. 1o the court significantly refused to extend this theory of
liability because:
The intended purpose of an automobile does not include its
participation in collisions with other objects, despite the
manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that such
collisions may occur."
The court further stated that any duty regarding design should be
imposed upon manufacturers by the legislature rather than the
courts. 
12
The Evans rationale of intended use was rejected in Larsen v. General
Motors Corp. 13 which held that a manufacturer is liable for enhanced
injuries resulting from design defects. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated:
[An automobile manufacturer.., is under a duty to use
reasonable care in the design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting
the user to. an unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a
collision. Collisions with or without fault of the user are clearly
foreseeable by the manufacturer and statistically inevitable.
4
The Larsen court agreed with Evans, however, that the manufacturer
has no duty to design a fool-proof or accident-proof vehicle. 15
7. See Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954) (braking system
located dangerously close to the ground causing brake failure).
8. See Elliot v. General Motors Corp., 296 F.2d 125 (7th Cir. 1961) (mechanic seriously cut
on sharp surface while repairing an automobile).
9. "Typically, the actions of the driver of the car in which the plaintiff is riding, or the
actions of the driver of another vehicle, or the actions of some third person, cause an
initial disruption or impact which in turn results in the plaintiff's colliding with the
interior (or occasionally the exterior) of the car. The plaintiff's collision with the car is the
so-called 'second collision.' " Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201,
206-07, 321 A.2d 737, 740.
10. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
11. Id. at 825.
12. Id. at 824.
13. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). The plaintiff alleged that General Motors was negligent in
designing the steering column, which protruded beyond the forward surface of the front
tires. This allegedly increased the danger of injury to the plaintiff from the rearward
displacement of the steering shaft in the event of a head-on collision.
14. Id. at 502.
15. Id.
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Accordingly, the duty imposed was limited to one of reasonable care in
the design of the product, consistent with the state of the art in order
to minimize the risk of injury in the event of a collision.'
6
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young' 7 was the first case in which
the Maryland Court of Appeals was called upon to decide the question
of a manufacturer's liability for a "second collision." In a certified
question of law, the court of appeals was asked:
Whether or not, under Maryland law, the definition of the
"intended use" of a motor vehicle includes the vehicle's
involvement in a collision and thus in turn, whether a cause of
action is stated against a manufacturer or importer of said
vehicle in breach of warranty or negligence or absolute liability
or misrepresentation by allegations that the design and manu-
facture of the vehicle unreasonably increased the risk of injury
to occupants following a collision not caused by any defects of
the vehicle. ' 8
The Young court, in applying the traditional rules of negligence found
that the intended purpose of an automobile is to provide not merely
transportation, but reasonably safe transportation.19 Recognizing that
collisions are foreseeable 20  the court went on to hold that the
16. Id. at 503.
17. 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974). Plaintiff's decedent, James Young, was stopped at a
traffic light when the Volkswagen which he was operating was struck in the rear by
another vehicle. Upon collision, the seat assembly was torn from the floor and the
plaintiff's decedent was thrown into the rear passenger compartment where he collided
with numerous structures and protrusions which were the proximate cause of the fatal
injuries. It was alleged that the seat assembly was "unreasonably vulnerable to separation
from the floor upon collision" and the rear compartment structures and protrusions were
unreasonably dangerous in the event of a collision.
18. Id. at 203-04, 321 A.2d at 738. The court did not consider the question of whether
misrepresentation could be used as a basis for recovery in product liability action for
personal injuries or wrongful death. The possibility of liability of the manufacturer for
breach of warranty was dismissed because the Volkswagen automobile was purchased in
Alabama and the general rule is " 'the law of the place of sale determines the extent and
effect of the warranties which attend the sale.' Schultz v. Tecumseh Prods., 310 F.2d 426,
428 (6th Cir. 1962)." Id. at 220, 321 A.2d at 747.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has not yet either accepted or rejected the strict
liability in tort theory of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
The theory of § 402A was held, in Young, not to apply to liability for injuries caused
by design defects. The court maintained that the phrase "seller has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of his product" has no application to "second-collision"
cases, since the existence of a defective design depends upon the degree of care, and the
reasonableness of such care, which the manufacturer has used. 272 Md. at 220-21, 321
A.2d at 747; accord, Frericks v. General Motors Cbrp., 274 Md. 288, 298-99, 336 A.2d
118, 124 (1975).
19. 272 Md. at 206, 321 A.2d at 740.
20. Between one quarter and two thirds of all vehicles manufactured are involved in a collision
during their subsequent use. 391 F.2d 495, 505 n. 8 (1968).
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manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care to provide a reasonable
degree of safety when these collisions occur.2 '
In its discussion of foreseeability, the Young court relied primarily
on Larsen and Bolm v. Triumph Motor Corp.2 2 Bolm, in rejecting
Evans, stated that under the traditional rules of negligence there is no
distinction between liability for a defective item that causes an accident
and a defective item that enhances the injuries upon impact from an
accident. The duty, in either case, is one of reasonable care.
The issue of a manufacturer's liability for design defects enhancing
an injury was once again brought to the attention of the Maryland
courts in Frericks v. General Motors Corp.2 3 The Maryland Court of
Appeals extended the negligence principles espoused in Young to an
action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability of the
Uniform Commercial Code24 and held that since the intended purpose
of a motor vehicle is to provide reasonably safe transportation,25 the
implied warranty logically means that a reasonable amount of safety
must be provided for inevitable collisions. In light of the Maryland
Uniform Commercial Code definition of "seller" which includes
manufacturers, 2 6 a proper breach of warranty action was stated against
both the manufacturer and the vendor.27
CONSISTENCY WITH PRIOR LAW
Prior to the resolution of the Larsen-Evans controversy in this state,
Maryland courts28 had staunchly adhered to the holding of Campo v.
Scofield,29 that an obvious defect would preclude liability as a matter
of law. Thus, in the leading case of Myers v. Montgomery Ward, 30
where the allegedly defective design was the absence of a safety guard
surrounding the blades of a power lawn mower, the Maryland court,
applying the "latent-patent" test, held that no cause of action was
21. 272 Md. at 217, 321 A.2d at 745.
22. 33 N.Y.2d 151, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 305 N.E.2d 769 (1973).
23. 274 Md. 288, 336 A.2d 118 (1975). In Frericks, the plaintiff alleged defects in both the
roof supports, which collapsed when the vehicle overturned, and the seat mechanism
which failed at the same time. The result of this particular chain of events, was the
"second-collision" which occurred between the head of the plaintiff, a passenger and the
collapsing roof. It was further alleged that General Motors was negligent in failing to warn
plaintiff of the design defects. The Court of Special Appeals in Frericks adopted the Evans
rationale.
24. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-314(c) (1975) Implied Warranty; Merchantability
"Goods .. . are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."
25. 272 Md. at 217, 321 A.2d at 745.
26. MD. ANN. CODE, Comm. L. Art., § 2-314(a) (1975).
27. 274 Md. at 303, 336 A.2d at 127.
28. Patten v. Logemann Bros., 263 Md. 364, 368-70, 283 A.2d 567, 569-70 (1971);
Blankenship v. Morrison Mach. Co., 255 Md. 241, 245-46, 257 A.2d 230, 231-33 (1969);
Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 292-95, 252 A.2d 855, 862-63 (1969).
29. 301 N.Y. 468,471, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804.
30. 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969).
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stated because the hazard was obvious to the user.3' Under this test,
proof of latency of the defect is essential to the survival of the
complaint, for only then can there be the common law duty on the part
of a manufacturer to warn of hidden dangers, utlimately giving rise to
liability.
32
The foreseeability test defined in Young and Frericks that collisions
are a foreseeable use of an automobile and a manufacturer has a duty to
provide a reasonable means of safety to guard against injury in the
event of a collision makes it crucial to determine whether the
"latent-patent" test is still alive and well in Maryland or has been put to
rest without a decent burial. While those who contend that the latter is
still the law in this state will draw attention to the holding in Young
that the defect was latent, 33 there was no mention of this distinction in
the Frericks decision. Consequently, a re-examination of foreseeability
is necessary to determine the present state of the law.
Larsen and its progeny promulgated the concept that a manufacturer
must produce a safe product, an automobile that provides "safe
transportation,"'  and elevated a manufacturer's duty to "eliminate
any unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury.",3' This approach necessi-
tates a determination by the court of whether the danger was
foreseeable to the manufacturer, not the user. Furthermore, in
determining the essential "unreasonableness" the courts have applied a
balancing test, considering the nature of the accident, price and utility
of the vehicle, style and attractiveness of the vehicle, and other relevant
factors. 36  Formerly, these factors would logically be applicable only to
the obviousness of the design and danger. This application was further
exemplified in Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.3 7 where the court,
after considering all the aforementioned factors said that the design and
the danger generated by it did not create an unreasonable risk of injury.
The design was obvious and was the "unique feature of the vehicle," 38
but patency alone did not preclude liability. The Dreisonstok case was
extensively quoted and relied upon by the Young court.39
In light of the foregoing, it would seem that the courts have edged
away from the strict Campo-Myers rule that latency is a question of law
31. Id. at 293, 252 A.2d at 862.
32. Id.
33. 272 Md. at 216, 321 A.2d at 745.
34. 391 F.2d at 502.
35. Id. at 503. See Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 219, 321 A.2d 737,
746 (1974).
36. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968); Volkswagen of
America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 219, 321 A.2d 737, 746 (1974);see Dreisonstok v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974); Dyson v. General Motors Corp.,
298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
37. 489 F.2d 1066 (plaintiff's leg was caught between the dashboard and the seat of the van,
designed without hood space protection).
38. Id. at 1074.
39. 272 Md. 213, 219, 321 A.2d 743, 746-47.
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and instead employed it as one factor in determining unreasonableness
of the risk. The rationale is that since a manufacturer's liability
emanates from his duty to warn of hidden danger, thereby enabling the
user to employ caution, his duty and subsequent liability are lessened
to the extent that the user has been alerted by its obviousness. Since
the user was afforded the opportunity to protect himself, the danger is
not "unreasonable." The risk, then, becomes a question of fact to be
determined by a jury considering all the circumstances bearing on the
issue. 40 The more apparent the danger, the more notice the consumer
has and, consequently, the risk to him is lessened.
Essentially, the Larsen and Young "foreseeable use" line of cases
have pre-empted "latent-patent" and relegated it to a secondary role as
a factor to be "balanced" by the trier of fact in determining risk.
Nevertheless, manufacturers will hasten to point out that the maker of
a knife has not been held liable to the user if the knife causes injury.
The reason according to Myers, is that the danger is obvious.41
However, under the Larsen and Young rule, a manufacturer is obligated
only to comply with safety standards available under the "present state
of the art.' 4 2 To go beyond that is to demand an impossibility. The
knife in Myers actually assumes the characteristics of the automobile in
Young that is involved in a high-speed, head-on collision with a
truck;4 3 the danger of injury is unavoidable due to the design required
for the knife's intended use no matter what may be attempted under
our contemporary technology. In both cases the degree of obviousness
is so great that it effectively eliminates the unreasonableness of the risk
in any balancing test made. In short, patency is merely another factor
in determining a manufacturer's liability for foreseeable defects.
Taking the approach of tempering the foreseeability duty with
patency as expounded by Larsen, Dreisonstok and Young naturally
leads to an extensive curtailment or modification of the original
"latent-patent" test of Campo and Myers, if not outright abandonment.
Strangely, though, Young cites Myers and its progeny authoritatively as
precluding liability where the design is apparent." Some courts,
however, have recognized the anomaly, and have commented on the
shift in weight that obviousness bears. In Byrnes v. Economic
Machinery Co.45 the proper guideline was stated with regard to the
"latent-patent" rule:
40. Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769 (1973).
41. 253 Md. at 293, 252 A.2d at 862.
42. 391 F.2d at 502 as quoted in 272 Md. at 217, 321 A.2d at 745-46.
43. 272 Md. at 219, 321 A.2d at 747.
44. Id. at 219-20, 321 A.2d at 747. "In addition, there can be no recovery if the danger
inherent in the particular design was obvious or patent to the user . . . 391 F.2d at 505."
45. 41 Mich. App. 192, 200 N.W.2d 104 (1972).
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In reality, these requirements bear on the unreasonableness of
the risk to which one is exposed.... If a risk is unreasonable
and foreseeable, a duty on the manufacturer's part may arise. 46
In the very recent case of Casey v. Gifford Wood Co. 47 the Michigan
Court of Appeals expressly overruled the "latent-patent" test and
established its future role:
The test of liability is no longer the latent-patent rule but
whether the danger from which the plaintiff suffered injury was
unreasonable and foreseeable. This is usually a jury question. 48
This consumer-oriented shift in the law is but one manifestation of the
modem trend toward growing consumer protection by expansion of
manufacturer's liability. Often a user will be well aware of the design
but will be hard put to correlate the relationship between design and
danger. Although the design is obvious, the risk of harm emanating
from particular design characteristics is not.4 9  Furthermore, the
superior knowledge of the manufacturer and his capabilities, places him
in a better position to remedy the shortcomings of his product before
any injuries are sustained. Addressing itself to this argument, the
Washington Court of Appeals in Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc. 50
held:
It seems to us that a rule which excludes the manufacturer from
liability if the object in his product is patent but applies the
duty if such a defect is latent is somewhat anomalous. The
manufacturer of the obviously defective product ought not
escape because the product was obviously a bad one. The law,
we think, ought to discourage misdesign rather than encourag-
ing it in its obvious form.5 '
As "latent-patent" fades into obsolescence, so too, does the duty
which gave rise to such a rule. The duty, as aforementioned, obligated a
manufacturer to produce a product free from hidden dangers, or in the
alternative, to disclose or warn of any such concealed hazards. Failure
to do so, imposed liability upon the one who breached this duty for
creating an unreasonable risk to the user. 2 The present duty is the one
46. Id at 201, 200 N.W.2d at 108.
47. Casey v. Gifford Wood Co.,.. Mich.-, 232 N.W.2d 360 (1975).
48. Id. at-, 232 N.W.2d at 365.
49. 1 L. FRUMMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILyrY § 7.02 (1968); 80 HARV. L. REV. 688
(1966).
50. 3 Wash. App. 508,476 P.2d 713 (1970).
51. Id. at 514, 476 P.2d at 718-19.
52. Id. at 514, 476 P.2d at 719.
1975] Young and Frericks 123
espoused by all followers of the Larsen rationale: the duty to
manufacture a safe product without ftirther qualification of this duty as
a matter of law.5 3  As applied to automobiles, Young expressly
recognized this view, calling it a "duty to use reasonable care in the
design of its vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk
of injury."' 4
It is thus apparent that the Maryland Court of Appeals in accepting
the "second collision" theory has in effect completely adopted the
expanded duty and rule of "unreasonable risk of a foreseeable danger"
although there may be an inconsistent attempt to retain the "latent-
patent" rule with respect to defects. The rejection of the "latent-
patent" distinction in "second collision" defect cases should also lead
to rejection of the "latent-patent" distinction in all design defect cases.
The question of whether a design defect is latent or patent should
simply be one of the factors considered in determining whether the
manufacturer has breached his duty to design a product which is
reasonably safe for the consumer.
With the acceptance of the Larsen view, Maryland has also refuted an
oft-raised contention, noted above55  that requirements concerning
design is a legislative, and not a judicial function.5 6 There are, however,
obvious advantages to having design standards set by the legislature.
Research can give a better understanding of design complexities and
standards would be more uniform and certain than courts could provide
with a case-by-case approach. 7
Section 108(c) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
of 196658 states, "compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety
standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from
any liability under common law."'' 9 This indicates that Congress did
not intend to supersede the judicial function of determining standards
53. In the seminal case on the present status of the "latent-patent" test, Pike v. Frank G.
Haugh Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970) the court held that
"the modern approach does not preclude liability solely because a danger is obvious." Id.
at 474, 467 P.2d at 235, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 635. When discussing the duty giving rise to
liability the court said:
The duty of a manufacturer with respect to the design of products, placed on the
market is defined in Restatement Second of Torts, section 398: "A manufacturer
of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it dangerous for the uses for
which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others whom he should expect to
use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use for physical harm caused by
its failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or design." Id.
at 470,467 P.2d at 232, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
54. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 217, 321 A.2d 737, 742 citing
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502.
55. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
56. See, e.g., Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. at 218, 321 A.2d at 746.
57. See 118 U. PA. L. REV.299, 305 (1969); 80 HARv.L. REv. 688, 689 (1967); 24 VAND.L.
R EV.862,868-69 (1971).
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1426 (1970).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1970).
124 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 5
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of care. Courts must respond to protect the public until such time as
the legislature adequately assumes its responsibility to the public, rather
than a few very powerful, highly motivated interest groups.
Furthermore, the argument that design requirements should be a
legislative, not a judicial function ignores the fact that the courts are
frequently called upon to decide technical issues that involve expert
testimony. 60  The strength of the judicial system is that it resolves
disputes of tremendous complexity. Neither the possibility of a deluge
of litigation nor the possibility that unsophisticated juries would not be
able to evaluate complex data presented at trial nor the fact that the
manufacturers might be subjected to different levels of duty in
different states should preclude, merely on the basis of public policy,
users of a product from recovering from a manufacturer for injuries
enhanced by a defect in design not causing the accident. 6 '
In compliance with this duty, the environment in which a product is
used should be considered by the manufacturer.6 2 A "manufacturer is
under no duty to design an accident-proof vehicle.., but such
manufacturer is under a duty to use reasonable care in the design of its
vehicle to avoid subjecting the user to an unreasonable risk of injury in
the event of a collision."6 3
The leading text writers64 are of the opinion that there is a duty on
the part of the manufacturer to use reasonable care in the construction
and design of its products. Dean Prosser states:
The greater number of decisions have denied any duty to
protect against the consequences of collisions, on the rather
specious ground that collision is not the intended use of the car,
but is an abnormal use which relieves the maker of responsi-
bility. It is, however, clearly a foreseeable danger arising out of
the intended use; and it cannot be expected that this reasoning
will continue to hold.65
In 1974 this reasoning did not "continue to hold." The number of
jurisdictions following Larsen is growing rapidly. 66 Courts are finding
60. See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 921 (1974), later appeal 513 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Amoco Oil Co. v.
E.P.A., 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478
F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Bayshore Dev. Co. v. Bonfoey, 75 Fla. 455, 78 So. 507 (1918).
61. Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wisc. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975). Cf. J. Henderson, Judicial
Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COL.
L. REV. 1531 (1973).
62. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
63. 391 F.2d 495, 502.
64. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 96 at 646 (4th ed. 1971).
65. Id.
66. The jurisdictions now following Larsen are:
California: Cronin v. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972); Horn v. General Motors Corp., 43 Cal. App. 3d 773, 110 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1973);
19751
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that there is "no rational basis for splitting the event of the collision
and allowing recovery where the condition of the automobile caused
the accident; the accident and injury are all part of the same happening
in which the defendant's failure to use reasonable care caused harm. 67
The Campo decision has been cited by manufacturers in automobile
design cases to support the elimination of a duty to design an
automobile so that it will be reasonably safe with respect to
second-collision injuries. New York, however, has rejected Campo as
being controlling in second-collision auto design defects cases and has
Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 109 Cal. Rptr. 410
(1973); Badorek v. General Motors, Inc., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970).
District of Columbia: Bremier v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 949 (D.D.C.
1972).
Florida: Evancho v. Thiel, 297 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1974).
Georgia: Friend v. General Motors Corp., 118 Ga. App. 763, 165 S.E.2d 734, cert.
dismissed, 224 Ga. 290, 167 S.E.2d 926 (1969).
Illinois: Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974); Fink v. Chrysler Motor
Co., 16 Ill. App. 3d 886, 308 N.E.2d 838 (1974); Mieher v. Brown, 3 111. App. 3d 802,
278 N.E.2d 869, rev'd on other grounds, 54 Ill. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973).
Iowa: Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972).
Louisiana: Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974).
Maryland: Volkswagen of America, Inc., v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 321 A.2d 737 (1974).
Michigan: Green v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 485 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1973); Larsen v.
General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Rutherford v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 60 Mich. App. 392, 231 N.W.2d 413 (1975).
Montana: Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc., 513 P.2d 268 (Mont. Sup. Ct.
1973); Ford v. Rupple, 504 P.2d 686 (Mont. 1972).
New Jersey: Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1975).
New York: Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 305 N.E.2d 769
(1973).
North Dakota: Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974).
Oregon: May v. Portland Jeep Inc., 265 Ore. 307, 509 P.2d 24 (1973).
Pennsylvania: Hardy v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 65 F.R.D. 359 (W.D. Pa. 1975);
Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
Rhode Island: Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974).
South Carolina: Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
South Dakota: Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973).
Tennessee: Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1973).
Texas: Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App. 1974).
Virginia: Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
Washington: Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 11 Wash. App. 800,
525 P.2d 286 (1974); Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 522 P.2d
829 (1974).
Wisconsin: Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 225 N.W.2d 431 (1975); Grundmanis v.
British Motor Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
The jurisdictions which still follow Evans are:
Indiana: Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S.
836 (1966).
Mississippi: General Motors Corp. v. Howard, 244 So. 2d 726 (Miss. 1971); Ford Motor
Co. v. Simpson, 233 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970); Walton v. Chrysler Corp., 229 So. 2d 568
(Miss. 1969).
Ohio: Burkhard v. Short, 28 Ohio App. 2d 141, 275 N.E.2d 632 (1971); Shumard v.
General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
West Virginia: McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W. Va.), aff'd, 472 F.2d
240 (4th Cir. 1973).
67. 80 HARV. L. REv. 688 at 689 (1967).
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adopted Larsen's common law negligence principles as the law of the
state.68
The known danger of operating an automobile should not be held to
make the danger "patent" as a matter of law. The consumer does not
voluntarily assume the danger and should certainly not be compelled to
do so. An automobile today is not a luxury, but an extremely
hazardous necessity which affects every person-driver, passenger, or
bystander.6 9
The care that a manufacturer should exercise should be that which is
reasonable under all circumstances. The question of whether a
manufacturer has failed to use such reasonable care and has thus made
the product unreasonably dangerous should be posed in terms of
whether, given the risks and benefits of and possible alternatives to the
product, we as a society will live with it in its present form or will
require an altered, less dangerous form. The question of whether the
product is a reasonable one, given the reality of its use in contemporary
society, becomes the familiar one of balancing the probability and
gravity of the harm to the consumer against the inconvenience of
precautions to the manufacturer.7 ° The manufacturer, unlike the
consumer, possesses the superior knowledge, expertise, and means to
improve the safety of his product. Unsafe designs may be eliminated;
accidents, many times, are unavoidable. In Young and Frericks,
Maryland has taken a major step forward in protecting the public and
the individual consumer.
John A. Currier
A bba David Poliakoff
68. The court of appeals in Bolm stated that Edgar v. Nachman, 37 App. Div. 2d 86, 323
N.Y.S.2d 53, (1971) relied on Campo to reach the broad proposition that injuries resulting
from a design defect not causing the accident were not actionable. The Edgar decision was
based either on (1) the danger of all second collision injuries is patent no matter what the
cause or (2) involvement in a collision is outside the "intended use" of a vehicle.
69. All of this boils down to the balancing test discussed in Young, Dreisonstok and Dyson.
70. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
